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NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND 
MATERIALISM WITHOUT REDUCTIONISM 
Eleonore Stump 
The major Western monotheisms, and Christianity in particular, are 
often supposed to be committed to a substance dualism of a 
Cartesian sort. Aquinas, however, has an account of the soul which 
is non-Cartesian in character. He takes the soul to be something 
essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in 
material components. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas's account is 
coherent and philosophically interesting; in my view, it suggests not 
only that Cartesian dualism isn't essential to Christianity but also 
that the battle lines between dualism and materialism are misdrawn. 
Introduction 
Many philosophers suppose that the major monotheisms, and Christianity 
in particular, are committed to substance dualism of a Cartesian sort. 
Descartes explained his dualism in this way: 
"my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It 
is true that I may have (or, to anticipate, that I certainly have) a 
body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the 
one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am 
simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I 
have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended, 
non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really 
distinct from my body, and can exist without it."l 
On this view, a person may have a body but is neither identical with 
it nor composed of it, and intellectual processes ("thinking") occur only 
in the nonmaterial thing that is the person, not in the body. There are 
"close" connections between a person and his body. The cognitive 
processes of the person have effects on the body which that person has, 
and bodily processes, such as sensations, have effects on the person; so a 
person and his body interact causally. But intellectual cognitive func-
tions are not exercised in or by the body; they take place in the thinking 
essence that is distinct from the body. 
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So understood, Cartesian dualism i~; widely regarded as false. If it is 
also the case that the major monotheisms have traditionally been commit-
ted to dualism of a Cartesian sort, then in the view of many philosophers 
the apparent or putative falsity of Cartesian dualism becomes an embar-
rassment for those religions. As a matter of historical fact, however, it is 
not true that a Cartesian sort of dualism has been the view traditionally 
espoused by all the major monotheisms. Thomas Aquinas, whose views 
surely represent one major strand of one major monotheism, is familiar 
with an account very like that of Cartesian dualism, which he associates 
with Plato; and he rejects it emphatically. 
In this paper, I will explore Aquinas's position. I will look at his rejec-
tion of a Cartesian sort of dualism and a t the position he adopts in place of 
it. I will also consider the broader metaphysical issues within which 
Aquinas's account of the soul is situated, and I will examine the explana-
tion Aquinas's account gives of the theological doctrine of the afterlife. 
Then I will turn to the vexed business of taxonomy. How should 
Aquinas's position be identified? For example, where - if anywhere - on 
the contemporary spectrum of opinions should Aquinas's account be locat-
ed? Finally, I will briefly discuss the way Aquinas's account sheds light on 
contemporary attempts to find some intermediate between Cartesian dual-
ism and eliminative materialism. 
Aquinas's rejection of Cartesian dualism 
In building his alternative to a Cartesian sort of dualism, Aquinas is 
guided by two complex, culturally conditioned sets of intuitions, each of 
which can be conveniently summed up by a biblical passage. The first is 
God's speech to fallen Adam, which Aquinas takes to apply to all subse-
quent human beings: "dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return" 
(Gen. 3:19). The second is the line of Ecclesiastes about human beings at 
the moment of death: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and 
the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Eccles.12:7). On the first set of 
intuitions, a human being is a material object, made out of the same sort of 
constituents as the earth is, and subject to dissolution by having those con-
stituents resolved back into earth. On the second set of intuitions, a human 
person survives death, whatever may happen to her body, because her 
spirit or soul continues to exist after the dissolution of her body. Aquinas 
thinks he can accommodate both these sets of intuitions with his account of 
the human soul. 
As is well known, Aquinas takes the soul to be the form of the body. 
What is much harder to grasp is what he means by this claim. It may help 
to begin by seeing the depth of his commitment to the view that human 
beings are material objects and the vehemence with which he rejects 
Cartesian dualism. 
The position we commonly refer to as 'Cartesian dualism' Aquinas asso-
ciates with Plato and thinks of as Platonism's account of the soul. So, for 
example, he says, 
"[if the Platonists were right that a human being is a soul using a 
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body], then when the impediment of the body is removed, the 
soul would return to its own nature, so that it could understand 
intelligible things simply ... as the angels do. But on this view the 
soul wouldn't be united to the body for the good of the soul, 
because on this view a soul united to a body would understand 
less well than when it is separated from the body ... and this posi-
tion is irrational."2 
Elsewhere he says, 
"Plato claimed that a human being is not a composite of soul and 
body but that a human being is the soul itself using a body, just as 
Peter is not a composite of a human being and clothes, but rather a 
human being using clothes. But this position is shown to be 
impossible. For an animal and a human being are natural, sense-
perceptible things. But this would not be the case if a body and its 
parts did not belong to the essence of a human being and of an 
animal. Instead, on Plato's view, the whole essence of both a 
human being and an animal would be the soul, although the soul 
isn't anything sense-perceptible or material. And for this reason it 
is impossible that [something that is] a human being and an ani-
mal be a soul using a body.'" 
Furthermore, Aquinas shares a common contemporary complaint 
against Cartesian dualism; Aquinas, too, thinks that this dualism will have 
difficulty explaining the interaction between soul and body. The 
Platonists, he says, think that the soul is united to the body through some 
intermediary because diverse, distinct substances cannot be bound togeth-
er unless something unites them. And so certain Platonists postulate one 
or another spirit or humor as the medium between soul and body. But 
none of these bizarre devices is necessary, Aquinas says, if the soul is 
understood as the form of the body.4 
It is clear, then, that Aquinas recognizes a position very similar to, if not 
identical with, Cartesian dualism, and that he rejects it unconditionally. 
His emphatic repudiation of Cartesian dualism should be kept in mind as 
we consider his own position. 
Aquinas on form: form as configuring 
Because he takes the soul to be the form of the body and because of the 
focus on form in his account, it will also be helpful to say something briefly 
about Aquinas's views of form. 
Although Aquinas thinks that not all forms are forms of material 
objects, nevertheless on his view all material things are composites of mat-
ter and form. Human beings, earthworms, daisies, rocking chairs, 
amethyst clumps, and bread dough share with all other material things the 
characteristic of having both matter and form. 'Matter' in this distinction 
between matter and form is an equivocal term, however. It can be used to 
refer either to what is itself a composite of matter and form or to what is 
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material but entirely formless. Understood in the second way, as formless 
matter, it is, of course, "prime" matter, something that exists only in poten-
tiality or in concept. (On Aquinas's view, anything material that exists 
actually, rather than merely potentially, will be a composite of matter and 
form.) A material composite itself is considered as just matter when that 
composite serves as a component - as the matter - for some other com-
posite which has a form of its own. For Aquinas, most material objects can 
be conceptually divided into an ordered series of matter-form composites. 
A typical medieval example given to illustrate the matter I form distinc-
tion is a bronze statue, but for our purposes here it will be more helpful to 
take a contemporary example. So consider the protein called 
'CAT I Enhancer-Binding Protein' (C/EBP), one of the proteins known to 
play an important role in regulating gene expression. In its active form, the 
molecule is a dimer with an alpha helix coil. On Aquinas's way of thinking 
about material objects, the form of C/EBP is the configuration of the dimer, 
including the alpha helix coil; and the dimer subunits constitute the matter. 
Of course, each dimer subunit is itself a composite. The form of the subunit is 
the configuration of its amino acids, in which, for example, in one region 
every seventh spot must be occupied by leucine; and the amino acids com-
posing the subunit are its matter. Amino acids themselves are also clearly 
composites, however. The matter of an amino acid such as leucine is the car-
bon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen of which it is composed, and the fonn 
is the way that material is combined, including the characteristic NH2 con-
figuration common to all the amino acids and the sequence of carbon and 
hydrogen peculiar to leucine. We can evidently go on in this way until we 
come, for example, to the proton of a hydrogen atom. The quarks that com-
pose it are its matter, and their configuration - the right combination of and 
interactions between up and down quarks - is the form of the proton. The 
point at which this conceptual decomposition into matter and form has to 
quit comes when what counts as the matter isn't itself a composite of matter 
and form anymore, that is, at the point at which we reach prime matter, 
when matter is conceptually stripped of all its forms.s 
In this example, we have been considering only what Aquinas would call 
'substantial forms'. These are the forms in virtue of which a material com-
posite is a member of the species to which it belongs. Nahlral material 
objects belong to a particular natural kind in virtue of the substantial form 
they have; and all material objects have the essence they have, or are what 
they are essentially, in virtue of their substantial form. The soul is the sub-
stantial form of a human being, the form in virtue of which the matter 
informed by it (that is, the matter-form composite) constitutes a living 
human body. The soul on Aquinas's account can therefore seem to be a uni-
versal, instantiable in more than one. 
Aquinas, however, takes the soul to be a particular, not a universal. How 
Aquinas's account is to be interpreted on this score and whether it has the 
resources to explain a substantial form's being a particular I will leave to a 
subsequent section of the paper." What is worth noticing here is that on 
Aquinas's account the soul not only is the form that makes this matter a liv-
ing human body but also is the form that makes the matter this human 
being. At any rate, when all that is left of a human being after death is the 
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soul, individuality persists on Aquinas's account. 
Finally, Aquinas also recognizes accidental forms, forms in virtue of 
which a thing has the accidents it has, such as a particular color or a certain 
size. Whether a person is stooped or straight-backed, educated or illiterate, 
is a matter of accidental forms. Accidental forms aren't a large part of 
Aquinas's account of the nature of the soul, however, and so I will say very 
little about them here. 
It should be clear that it is a mistake to identify form in general simply 
with shape. In general, the form (the substantial and accidental forms 
taken together) of a material object is the arrangement of the matter of that 
object in such a way that it constitutes that object rather than some other 
one. This arrangement will commonly be a function not only of the shape 
of the matter, but also of the properties of the material parts and the ways 
those parts relate causally to each other. Form for Aquinas is not static 
but dynamic, something that includes the functioning of and the causal 
interactions among the parts. That is why he thinks that when we use the 
names of the living body and its parts for the dead body and its parts, we 
use those words equivocally. Once a human being dies and the soul is 
gone, he says, we use such words as 'flesh' or 'eye' equivocally if we 
apply them to the corpse.? At death, the soul is replaced with a different, 
non-animating substantial form. The matter of the body is then configured 
in a substantially different way and so has a form different from the one it 
had before death.' That is why the body can be called 'a human body' 
only equivocally even immediately after death. If Aquinas took form to be 
simply shape, however, or some other static set of characteristics, then he 
would take the eye of the corpse to have the same form it did when the 
body was living. That he supposes there to be a complete change of form 
at death shows that dynamic interactions among the material parts of a 
thing are an important element of the form, on his view. 
Finally, unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas thought that any 
given material object has only one substantial form."' That is, C/EBP does 
not have one substantial form in virtue of which it is a dimer, another in 
virtue of which it is a protein, another in virtue of which it is a compound 
of nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon, and so on. On Aquinas's view, 
there is just one substantial form for C/EBP which makes it the kind of 
molecule it is, a dimer of amino acid subunits composed of certain ele-
ments related to one another in particular ways and themselves comprised 
of other components ordered in particular ways. When Aquinas says that 
the soul is the form of the body, he means that it is the single, substantial 
form of the bodv. 
On the basi; of this brief consideration of Aquinas's views of forms, 
including the form that is the soul, it seems not unreasonable to think that 
by 'form' Aquinas means an essentially configurational state. lO In general, 
a substantial form is the configurational state of something that makes it a 
member of the kind or species to which it belongs. In the case of a human 
being, the substantial form is the divinely created configurational state of 
the matter constituting the body which makes that matter not only a 
human body but in fact this living human body, capable of human action 
and operation, including cognitive function. 
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Matter configured by forlll 
Before looking in more detail at Aquinas's account of the soul, it may be 
helpful to reflect on the nature of his account of material objects in general. 
On Aquinas's view, as we increase complexity in systems, even systems 
of inanimate things, properties emerge which are properties of the system 
but not properties of the material parts of the system. C/EBP, for example, 
has the property of being able to regulate genes, and it has this property 
because the shape of the molecule as a whole allows it to track the major 
groove of the helix of DNA and so bind to it in a way crucial for gene regu-
lation. If the protein were denatured, so that it retained its constituents but 
no longer had the same shape, it would no longer be able to regulate genes. 
There are many other such examples in nature. The normal prion protein 
differs from the disease-causing prion protein in virtually no respect except 
the three-dimensional arrangement of the molecule. But normal prion pro-
tein is an innocuous part of ordinary neurons, while the differently struc-
tured prion protein can afflict brains with spongiform degeneration. II 
Now the shape of a molecule results from the configuration of the compo-
nents of the molecule, from their chemical and physical properties and the 
biochemical processes by which they causally interact with each other. The 
shape of the molecule is thus not just a sum of the shapes of the parts of 
that molecule; rather, the shape is an emergent property of the molecule as 
a whole.12 On Aquinas's account, the fact that material objects are compos-
ites of matter and form means that material objects can have emergent 
properties of this sort, and these emergent properties may bring with them 
further emergent properties, such as causal potentialities which belong to 
the whole but not to its parts. 
(There are, of course, different understandings of the notion of emergent 
property.ll Here I am using 'emergent' in Searle's sense, in which a proper-
ty is emergent in case it is a feature or property of a whole or system, is not 
a property of the parts of that system, and can be explained in terms of the 
properties of the parts of the system and the causal interactions among the 
parts. 14 C/EBP may also, however, exemplify what Searle calls "a much 
more adventurous conception" of emergence, in which a feature of the 
whole system can't be explained just in terms of the properties of the indi-
vidual parts of the system and the causal interactions among those parts." 
In virtue of its shape (which is a feature of the whole system), C/EBP has 
the causal power to regulate genes (itself another feature of the whole sys-
tem). But, for some large proteins, the shape of the biologically active mol-
ecule doesn't result just from the properties and causal interactions among 
the atoms that constitute the molecule"'; and knowing the molecule's con-
stituent atoms and the way those atoms can interact with one another is 
not enough to explain or predict the shape of the biologically active mole-
cule. That is because the shape is produced by the interaction of the atoms 
of the molecule with enzymes that catalyze folding.17 In that sort of case, 
the feature of being able to regulate genes would be emergent in Searle's 
"more adventurous" sense of 'emergent'.") 
Furthermore, although accounts of emergentism are typically couched 
in terms of emergent properties, on Aquinas's way of thinking about mate-
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rial objects what can emerge when form is imposed on matter is not just 
properties but substances. When material components are combined into 
something higher-level with a particular configuration, a substance will 
come into being.'C) Aquinas's account is thus anti-reductionistic.20 It isn't 
true on his account that a material whole is nothing but its material parts or 
is identical to its material components." Given his views, it also won't be 
true that macrolevel features of the whole can always be explained entirely 
in terms of the microlevel properties and relations of the parts. The config-
uration of the microlevel components isn't itself a micro level property and 
in certain cases can't be explained solely on the basis of the components' 
properties and interactions with one another. Nonetheless, the configura-
tion will sometimes confer features such as causal powers on the whole 
system which are not shared by the components of the system. 
The soul as configuring matter 
With this much clarification of Aquinas's account behind us, we are in a 
position to look further at what he has to say about the soul. 'Soul' is 
Aquinas's generic term for the substantial forms of material objects that are 
living. On his use of the term, then, plants have souls, too, not in the sense 
that they enjoy being talked to or in the sense that they may be reincarnat-
ed as something higher up the ladder of being in the next life, but only in 
the sense that plants are living things. On his view, a plant has a soul in 
virtue of the fact that it has a configuration of matter which allows for 
nutrition, growth, reproduction, and the other sorts of activities common 
to living things. Animals have souls, since they, too, are living things; but 
the configuration of their matter allows them an operation not possible for 
plants, namely, perception. The forms that constitute human beings allow 
for a still further set of operations, namely, intellective processes. 
Because the human soul has this distinctive set of capacities, Aquinas 
tends to call it 'the intellective soul', or 'the rational soul' to distinguish it 
from the nutritive soul of plants and the sensitive (i.e., capable of percep-
tion) soul of animals generally. The intellective soul is that configuration 
on the basis of which something exists as this living human body. There 
isn't a configuration of matter that makes the body a human body and then 
another configuration that is the intellective soul, Aquinas says: "There is 
no other substantial form in human beings apart from the intellective 
soul" .22 In virtue of this one form, a human being exists as an actual being, 
as a material object, as a living thing, as an animal, and as a human being 
with cognitive capacities.23 For this reason, Aquinas tends also to call the 
soul the act of the body, because it is in virtue of the soul that something is 
actually a living human body.24 
Since he takes the soul to be a kind of form and since he thinks of forms 
as essentially configurational states, Aquinas holds that the soul is immate-
rial. The immateriality of the soul is thus for him a direct consequence of 
his view of the soul as a form.2; Similarly, he takes the soul to be simple in 
virtue of its being an essence or nature. A soul is not simple in the way a 
point is,'" Aquinas says; rather it is simple just in the sense that it is not the 
sort of thing that has a certain quantity.2? On the other hand, considered 
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with respect to what it effects rather than with respect to what it is - that 
is, in its powers or operations- the soul is manifold rather than simple, 
and the various parts of the body are configured by it in differing ways.2K 
Because the soul is the form of the body, it has a spatial location; while 
the body is alive, the soul is located where the body is.29 Aquinas's views 
on this point are somewhat complicated. We can take the form of the body 
to be a whole in various ways, he says. Considered with regard to the 
wholeness of essence, for instance, the whole soul is entirely in each part of 
the body, just as whiteness is entirely in each part of a completely white 
thing. We can also, however, consider a thing whole with respect to its 
operations. Considered just with regard to wholeness of operation, the 
whole soul is not in each part of the body, since the operations of the soul 
are localized in various parts of the body, as, for example, sight is (on his 
view) localized in the eyes. 
Some operations, such as intellect and will, are not localized in any 
particular organ of the body, he thinks,'" although he does take it on 
medical authority that a lower-level cognitive faculty (which he calls 
'particular reason') is located in the brain.31 Nonetheless, he does not 
hold, as Descartes apparently did, that higher cognitive functions occur 
only in the soul and not in the body. On the contrary, Aquinas thinks 
that there is something misleading about attributing cognitive functions 
just to the soul itself. Rather, even such higher cognitive functions as 
understanding are to be attributed to the whole material composite that 
is the human being. "We can say that the soul understands," he says, "in 
the same way that we can say that the eye sees; but it would be more 
appropriate to say that a human being understands by means of the soul."'2 
And he specifically identifies the intellect itself with the form of the 
body: lithe intellect, which is the source of intellective function, is the 
form of the human body."'3 
Finally, as his rejection of a Cartesian sort of dualism has made clear, 
Aquinas does not identify a human being with his soul." Instead, it is 
his view that "a human being is not a soul only but rather a composite 
of soul and body.!!35 There is something redundant about this descrip-
tion of the composite since Aquinas thinks that there is a living human 
body only when matter is configured by the form that is the soul. 3n 
Given his view that the soul is the single substantial form of a living 
human body, we would expect him to say instead that a human being is 
a composite of matter and soul, not body and soul. Nonetheless, 'body 
and soul' is a common Thomistic description of the material composite 
that a human being is. It may be that the problem here is an artifact of 
translation; in some contexts, the Latin word translated 'body' ('corpus') 
refers just to matter.37 
At this point, it is easy to see how Aquinas's account fits the first set of 
intuitions that I said shapes it, namely, that human beings are dust and will 
return to dust. But it isn't at all easy to see how his account can accommo-
date the second set of intuitions, namely, that at death the human soul 
doesn't cease to exist when the composite of soul and body disintegrates, 
that there is an afterlife in which the disembodied soul persists. 
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Aquinas on form: form as configured 
In fact, at this point, we may think that Aquinas's account can't accom-
modate the claim that souls persist and engage in mental acts after the 
death of the body. 
In the first place, if the separated soul is an essentially configurational 
state, what is it a state of? Aquinas isn't a universal hylomorphist; he does-
n't think that there is a sort of ghostly ectoplasm that can be configured by 
the forms of immaterial things, such as souls or angels. And so when he 
claims that the separated soul exists apart from the body, he seems to be 
holding the peculiar and perplexing view that there can be an essentially 
configurational state with nothing that is configured. Secondly, Aquinas 
thinks that the separated soul engages in mental acts. But an essentially 
configurational state isn't the sort of thing that engages in acts of any sort, 
and so it seems that even if there were some way to explain the existence of 
the soul apart from the body, there is no possibility that the separated soul 
can engage in any actions. 
These questions wouldn't have surprised Aquinas. In his work, he con-
fronts objectors making similar points. If the human soul is the form of the 
body, then it must be the case that it depends on the body for existence. But 
what depends on something else for existence, the objector protests, isn't a 
this and can't exist on its own; consequently, neither can the soul, if it is the 
form of the body." Elsewhere Aquinas also considers this objection: "forms 
dependent on matter as regards being don't have being themselves, strictly 
speaking; rather, the composites have being through the forms."',) 
Therefore, the objection implies, the soul, which is the form of the body, has 
its being only in the being of the body and can't exist or act apart from it. 
In my view, these perplexities stem, at least in part, from too limited a 
view of what Aquinas has in mind with the notion of form; they result 
from focusing on form only in matter-form composites. Something more 
needs to be said therefore about Aquinas's views of form. 
On Aquinas's view, to be is to be configured or to have a form, and 
everything is what it is in virtue of a form. So a broader way to understand 
his view of form is this. Weare inclined to suppose that there is something 
about matter itself which allows it to be configured. (Or perhaps we are so 
familiar and comfortable with the notion of configurations of matter that 
we don't suppose matter's ability to be configured requires any explana-
tion.) But for Aquinas the ability of matter to be configured is just a conse-
quence of the fact that matter has being, and what is fundamentally config-
ured is not matter but being. 
It was Augustine's view that being is a matter of having order, species, 
and mode, and Aquinas adopts and develops this Augustinian idea. An 
angel, for Aquinas, is immaterial but configured since it has order and 
species, that is, since it is a kind of thing with one rather than another set of 
characteristics. Anything that has being - whether that thing is material 
or immaterial- will be like this. So just in virtue of being it will have con-
figuration or form. Understanding this point helps to explain why 
although Aquinas is perfectly content to deny matter of God, he refuses to 
deny form of God: being, even divine being, is being configured. 
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This broader understanding of form is useful for the problems under 
consideration, because it introduces an ambiguity into the notion of form."" 
There are forms, such as the form of C/EBP, which are forms in the sense 
that they give a configuration to something. And then there are forms that 
don't configure something else but that are rather themselves configured. 
On Aquinas's view, angels are forms in this latter sense. They are immater-
ial substances with order, species, and mode, but without matter; and 
Aquinas takes them to be forms existing and operating without matter.41 
There is nothing incoherent about the notion of an immaterial substance 
that has one rather than another set of characteristics and that exists and 
engages in actions of some sort. God and angels are forms in this sense.42 
It is possible, then, for there to be forms that exist apart from matter and 
engage in actions, when we understand form in this broader sense, as what 
is itself ordered or configured in a certain way, rather than configuring. 
But now the problem seems to be that on Aquinas's view the human 
soul at death must undergo a fairly radical transformation, from being a 
configuring form to being a configured form. If we think, roughly, of 
forms in the first sense as properties and forms in the second sense as sub-
stances, then it seems as if the soul on Aquinas's account has to jump cate-
gories at death; and a transformation of that sort will seem to many 
philosophers to be not just radical but impossible. 
Aquinas 011 form: configured configurers 
Here it is helpful to recognize that it is possible for something to be both 
configured and a configurer of other things. This is so, in familiar and 
unproblematic ways, as regards material objects. So, for example, C/EBP 
is configured, in the ways explained in detail above. But it is also a config-
urer. When it is bound in the right way to DNA, it helps to unravel the 
DNA molecule, thereby reconfiguring the DNA in such a way as to make 
transcription possible. Furthermore, before it is bound to DNA, C/ EBP 
isn't configuring anything; it's just itseIf configured. Nonetheless, it does-
n't undergo any radical transformation, or hop any categories, when it 
changes from being unbound to DNA and non-configuring to being bound 
and configuring. C/EBP was all along a configured configurer, a config-
ured molecule with a capacity to configure other molecules, and its nature 
doesn't change when it exercises that capacity. 
Analogous things can be said about the human soul on Aquinas's 
viewY For Aquinas, the metaphysical world is ordered in such a way that 
at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy there are forms - God and the 
angels - which are configured but which aren't configurational con-
stituents of anything else. These forms are configured but non-configuring. 
Near the bottom of the hierarchy are forms that configure matter but don't 
exist as configured things in their own right. The form of an amethyst is 
like this. Such forms are configuring but non-configured. And in the mid-
dle are human souls, the amphibians of this metaphysical world, occupy-
ing a niche in both the material and the spiritual realm. Like the angels, 
the human soul is itself configured; but like the forms of other material 
things, the human soul has the ability to configure matter. The human 
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soul, then, is a configured configurer. Consequently, in the transition from 
configuring matter to not configuring matter, the human soul doesn't 
undergo any radical metaphysical transformation or category switching, 
any more than the molecule C/EBP does when it goes from not configur-
ing to configuring DNA. It remains what it always was, something config-
ured with an ability to configure other things. 
Understanding the soul in this way helps to explain some of the puz-
zling things Aquinas says about it. 
For example, Aquinas takes the forms of material objects generally to 
come into existence with the existence of their composites; and although 
God is the ultimate or remote cause of the existence of such forms, the 
proximate cause is just the cause that brings about the existence of the com-
posite. After canvassing various opinions about the forms of material 
objects that he takes to be mistaken, Aquinas summarizes the flaws of 
those opinions in this way: 
"All these [mistaken] opinions seem to have developed from a 
common root, because they were all seeking a cause for forms as if 
the forms themselves came into being in their own right. But, as 
Aristotle shows, what comes into being, properly speaking, is the 
composite. Now the forms of things that are corruptible some-
times exist and sometimes don't exist, without its being the case 
that they themselves are generated or corrupted; rather the com-
posites are generated or corrupted ... , So since like comes to be 
from like, we should not seek some immaterial form as the cause 
of corporeal forms, but rather some composite .... In this way, then, 
corporeal forms are caused not as infused from some immaterial 
form but as matter is brought from potentiality to actuality by 
some composite agent."44 
But in this regard the human soul is different from all other forms that 
configure matter. It is created directly by God and infused into matter. This 
is what we might expect once we know that the soul is configured, as the 
angels are; the angels, too, are created directly by God. On the other hand, 
however, Aquinas rejects vehemently the notion that the soul can be created 
before the body and then infused into an already existent body. He says, 
"if the soul is united to the body as its form and is naturally part of 
human nature, then it is completely impossible [for the soul to be 
created before the body] .... Since the soul is a part of human 
nature, it doesn't have its natural perfection unless it is united to 
the body. And so it would not have been fitting to create the soul 
without the body .... "" 
That is why, he says, the soul is created in the body, and souls are pro-
duced simultaneously with human bodies"h, at the culmination of human 
generationY He is willing to maintain this position even in the face of what 
seem to be religiously worrisome objections. Aquinas imagines an objector 
asking about children produced by adultery. If the divinely created 
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human soul comes into existence only simultaneously with the body of 
which it is the form, and if some children are the product of adulterous 
liaisons, won't God be concurring in the sin of adultery? God does concur 
in the action of the adulterer in such a case, Aquinas says, insofar as that 
action is natural and therefore good; God fails to concur only with what is 
evil in the action.4p 
Because the form that is the human soul is a configured configurer, it 
thus has a double aspect. On the one hand, unlike the forms of other mate-
rial objects, the soul is created by God, as an individual thing in its own 
right, with its own configuration. On the other hand, like the form of any 
material object, it exists in the composite it configures, and it comes into 
existence only with that composite, not before it. 
On this way of understanding the form that is the human soul, it is also 
easier to see why Aquinas thinks that the soul makes matter be not just 
human but also this human being. The soul itself is an individual config-
ured form, and each soul is as it were handcrafted by God. Aquinas says, 
"everything has its being and its individuation from the same 
source .... Therefore, as the being of the soul is from God as from 
an active principle, ... so also the individuation of the soul, even if 
it has a certain relationship to the body, doesn't perish when the 
body perishes."49 
Given this double aspect of the soul, it's not surprising that Aquinas sup-
poses that the individuality of the person persists after death in the sepa-
rated soul. Not only is there continuity of cognitive and conative faculties 
between the material object that is the human being and the separated 
soul; but the separated soul, as a configured form, is what makes a human 
being this particular individual. 
Finally, this view of the human form helps to alleviate some of the prob-
lems thought to be raised by the notion of the resurrection of the body. On 
Aquinas's view of the soul, there is mental continuity between a human 
person before death and the resurrected human person. Moreover, since 
the soul was what made matter this human being, presumably in the res-
urrection of the body it will again make the matter it informs this human 
being. Preservation of identity will not have to be guaranteed by recom-
posing the human being of the identical atoms as before, and puzzles 
about what happens when the same atoms have been part of more than 
one human being are avoided. 
Aquinas's view here has something in common with Sydney 
Shoemaker's views of human persons. Shoemaker thinks that it is possible 
for there to be a brain-state transfer device which transfers a person's brain 
states from one body to another and thereby preserves an individual per-
son in being through a succession of bodies. Shoemaker's brain states are 
presumably configurational states, since there is an interval, however 
small, in which the states are in the process of being transferred and so are 
no longer in the first body and not yet in the second,s° and yet the states 
don't go out of existence in this interval. On Aquinas's view, the interval 
may be much longer, and in that interval the configurational state can con-
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tinue to operate, since it is itself something configured. Nonetheless, on 
both Aquinas's account and Shoemaker's, the imposition of the configura-
tional state on new matter preserves the identity of the person.51 
Cartesian dualism redivivus? 
At this point it may seem that this interpretation of Aquinas's account 
has rescued it from some pressing problems only to enmesh it in all the 
equally difficult problems of Cartesian dualism, and that Aquinas has after 
all succumbed to the Platonic dualism from which he was so concerned to 
dissociate his own views. As I have explained Aquinas's account of the 
soul, doesn't it collapse into Cartesian or Platonic dualism? Isn't Aquinas's 
view just another version of the ghost in the machine? 
Here, I think, the answer is clearly 'no', and for reasons that are in a 
sense two sides of the same coin. On Cartesian dualism, (1) both the soul 
and the body are substances in their own right. Each can engage in acts 
independently of the other, and each can causally effect the other. 
Together soul and body make up a human being, but (2) the soul is a sepa-
rate integral part of a human being, as a roof is a separate integral part of a 
house. That's why thinking can go on in the soul, but not be in the body at 
the same time. On Aquinas's account, both (1) and (2) are false. 
In the first place, although for Aquinas the separated soul exists on its 
own after death, it nonetheless isn't a substance in its own right. Aquinas 
distinguishes two kinds of things that can exist on their own, those that are 
complete substances and those that just subsist, that is, that exist on their 
own but are not complete substances. A hand52 or a partially built but 
incomplete house is a subsistent thing in this latter sense, C, and so is the 
soul. "Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person," he says, 
"but [only] that which has the complete nature of the species. So a hand or 
a foot cannot be called a hypostasis or a person, and similarly, neither can 
the soul, since it is [only] a part" of a complete human being.54 And so 
Aquinas says both that 
"Intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and although they exist 
in matter, their being does not depend on matter"SS 
and that 
''body and soul are not two actually existing substances; instead, 
one actually existing substance arises from these two."'" 
The soul is therefore just a part, although a subsistent part, of the substance 
that is a human being.57 
It isn't, however, an integral part of a human being. If we think of inte-
gral parts as components that together compose a material whole,'" as a 
roof is a part of a house and a head is part of a body, then no forms are 
integral parts of the material objects to which they belong. When Aquinas 
lists the parts of a house, he tends to list such things as foundation, walls, 
and roof; he wouldn't add the form of the house as one more item on the 
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list59 • On the other hand, when we think of the constitution of a material 
object such as C/EBP, then an important part of what we consider is the 
configuration in which its component molecules and atoms are organized. 
There can be metaphysical, as well as integral, parts, in some extended 
sense of 'part'; and a form is a part of a whole only in such an extended 
sense. As a part of this sort, the form couldn't interact causally with the 
matter it informs. The form has causal influence in the sense that the com-
posite has the causal influence it does because of its form. But it makes no 
sense to think, for example, of the configuration of C/EBP interacting 
causally with the matter of C/EBP. 
So Aquinas rejects both (1) and (2), which are characteristic of Cartesian 
dualism, and he does so because he takes the soul to be a configured con-
figurer. Because the soul is something configured, it is a subsistent thing. 
But because it is a configurer of matter, it isn't a complete substance in its 
own right, and it isn't even an integral part of a complete substance. For 
that reason, the body exercises efficient causality in virtue of the soul, but 
the soul doesn't exercise efficient causality on the matter it informs. As far 
as that goes, the matter it informs couldn't exercise efficient causality on 
the soul either; the matter can engage in causal interactions only in virtue 
of being configured as it is, that is, in virtue of the soul. 
We can sum up the differences between Descartes and Aquinas by saying 
that Descartes, unlike Aquinas, sees the soul only as configured, and not also 
as a configurer; Descartes's soul doesn't inform matter to constitute a body. 
In consequence of this difference, Aquinas's account is not vulnerable to the 
two main problems thought to afflict Cartesian dualism, namely, that it can't 
explain the nature of the causal interaction between soul and body and that 
it divides cognitive functions into those that can be implemented only in the 
soul and those that can be implemented only in the body. On Aquinas's 
account, there is no efficient causal interaction between the soul and the mat-
ter it informs, and all cognitive functions can be implemented in the body. 
Dust and spirit 
Does Aquinas then succeed in reconciling the two sets of intuitions I 
said earlier guided his account of the soul, namely, that human beings are 
composed of dust and return to it, and that at death the spirit returns to 
God who gave it? The answer, I think, is 'yes'. 
Since Aquinas thinks of a human being as a composite of matter and 
soul and since he recognizes that dead human bodies decay, he does in fact 
believe that a human being falls apart at death. The disembodied soul 
which persists is not the complete human being who was the composite 
but only a part of that human being.60 In response to the question whether 
the saints in heaven can pray for us, an objector says, "the soul of Peter 
isn't Peter. So if the souls of the saints pray for us when they are separated 
from the body, we ought not to call on 5t. Peter to pray for us but rather on 
the soul of 5t. Peter" Aquinas's reply is to grant the point that the soul is 
not the complete human being but to argue for the appropriateness of call-
ing the part (the soul) by the name of the whole (the composite of matter 
and form that Peter was and will be).6J 
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The disembodied soul after death is consequently something like the 
mirror image of a human being who is in a persistent vegetative state. A 
human being in an irreversible vegetative state is an incomplete human 
being. So, in a very different sense, is a disembodied soul, on Aquinas's 
view. When the soul of a person is separated from the body, Aquinas 
thinks, the cognitive powers that person had are curtailed and restricted; 
and, for certain cognitive functions, Aquinas feels constrained to give com-
plicated considerations to show how the disembodied soul could engage in 
them at all "2. As for knowledge of material things in the world that would 
ordinarily be cognized with sense perception, Aquinas attributes the dis-
embodied soul's ability to cognize such things to divine intervention.b3 
Aquinas holds that disembodied existence isn't natural to the soul. If it 
weren't for the miserableness of the fallen human condition, which includes 
the necessity of dying - that is, the separation of soul and body - the soul 
would never exist in a disembodied state. 64 Furthermore, the soul's exis-
tence in a disembodied state is an impermanent as well as an unnatural con-
dition. It is contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the body, 
Aquinas says, and nothing contrary to nature can be perpetual. 
Consequently, the soul's separation from the body cannot last."' In the gen-
eral resurrection of the dead, at the last judgment, souls will be reimbodied. 
Except for the interim period, human persons in the afterlife wiII be like 
human persons in this life, in the sense that they will be material composites 
of matter and form. After the period of disembodied existence, the soul will 
again exist as a constituent of a body, as it did before death."" Nevertheless, 
although existence apart from the body isn't natural to the soul, and 
although the soul as the form of the body isn't itself a complete substance, 
on Aquinas's view it is possible for the soul to exist apart from the body 
and, with divine help, to engage in cognitive functions in that condition. 
For these reasons Aquinas can accept the claim that at death the spirit 
returns to God who made it. Given the way he understands this claim, 
however, it turns out after all not to be incompatible with the claim that 
human beings are dust. 
To sum up, then, the soul is an essentially configurational state which is 
immaterial and subsistent, able to exist on its own apart from the body. On 
the other hand, the soul is the form that makes the living human body 
what it is. While it is possible with divine help for the soul to exist and 
exercise cognitive function on its own, apart from the body, that state is 
unnatural to it. In the natural condition, human cognitive functions are to 
be attributed to the whole composite and not to the soul alone, although 
the composite exercises cognitive functions by means of the soul. 
Mental properties are emergent, on this view, insofar as they are fea-
tures which are dependent on the configuration and composition of the 
whole; they are not identical to the properties of the material parts of the 
whole, but they emerge from the properties and dynamic interactions of 
those parts. The intellective soul is essentially configurational, but in its 
natural state it is a configuration of matter. If we can understand the intel-
lective part of the human soul as roughly equivalent to the mind, then for 
Aquinas the mind is immaterial but implemented (in its natural condition) 
in matter. A human being, who is a composite of matter and form, can 
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engage in cognitive functions in virtue of his form, the soul; but in the nat-
ural condition, it is the whole composite and not the soul alone that under-
stands and cognizes and the rest."; Would Aquinas think that the mind is 
identical to the brain if he had known enough neuroscience? Given what 
he says about the separated soul, the answer, of course, has to be 'no'. But 
even if we ask just about the mind before death, in its natural, embodied 
state, it seems less misleading to say that he would have thought that the 
mind emerges from the functioning of the brain, since the human form on 
his account is dynamic rather than static. 
Taxonomy: Materialism without Reductionism 
How are we to understand Aquinas's account? It is clear that he rejects 
the Cartesian sort of dualism. On the other hand, Aquinas seems clearly 
in the dualist camp somewhere since he thinks that there is an immaterial 
and subsistent constituent to the subject of cognitive function. 
What sort of dualist is he? Since the forms of material objects in general 
don't exist on their own and since the soul isn't a complete substance, we 
might think he should be classified just as some sort of property dualist. 
He does, however, hold that the soul can exist without the body, and his 
position is thus stronger than ordinary property dualisms. Perhaps we 
should invent a new genus subsistence dllalism, under which substance dual-
ism will be one species and Aquinas'S account of the soul another. But per-
haps we need not be so fussy. It is clear that Aquinas's account of the soul 
is more nearly allied with substance dualism than with property dualism; 
and if we don't take 'substance' in 'substance dualism' too strictly (if it can 
include subsistent things that aren't complete substances), then we can 
count Aquinas among the substance dualists. 6S In that case, we ought to 
categorize Aquinas as a non-Cartesian substance dualist and put him in the 
camp of those opposed to physicalism. 
Matters are not so simple here, however. Dennett takes it to be charac-
teristic of dualism to hold that the mind is not composed of matter and that 
scientific investigation of the brain can't teach us anything about the 
mind.69 Shoemaker thinks that what characterizes dualism is the view that 
a person is something distinct from his body and so has any physical states 
only derivatively.70 But if Dennett and Shoemaker are right about what 
dualism is, then Aquinas shouldn't be counted among the dualists. 
Aquinas takes human beings to be matter-form composites, and he attrib-
utes cognition to the whole human being: 'We can say that the soul under-
stands in the same way that we can say that the eye sees, but it would be 
more appropriate to say that a human being understands by means of the 
soul."7! Since on his view the subject that engages in cognition is a material 
substance, it will be possible to investigate that subject by the methods for 
investigating matter. Furthermore, Patricia Churchland takes it to be one 
of the main characteristics of physicalism to hold that "mental states are 
implemented in neural stuf£"72. But if this characterization of physicalism;3 
is right, Aquinas should apparently be grouped with the physicalists. 
Although Aquinas mistakenly supposes that the intellect is tied to no par-
ticular bodily organ, he nonetheless holds that the intellectual soul is the 
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form constituting the human body as a whole. On his view, therefore, 
mental states will be implemented in matter. His account of the soul is con-
sequently compatible with supposing that mental states are implemented 
in neural stuff. 
At this point it might occur to someone to suppose that it can hardly be 
surprising that Aquinas's account of the soul isn't readily assimilable to 
either dualism or physicalism; the difficulty in categorizing Aquinas, such 
a person might think, stems from trying to insert a peculiarly medieval the-
ory into the contemporary discussion, where it simply won't fit. But I 
think this is a mistaken attitude. 
Consider, for example, Richard Boyd's recent defense of a functionalist 
version of materialism. Boyd argues that, although materialism is some-
times taken to include the claim that mental states are identical to physical 
states, materialism is in fact committed just to the claim that the mind is 
composed of matter. "Materialism, properly understood, does not entail 
the sort of mind-body identity statements against which the essentialist 
[i.e., anti-materialist) criticisms are directed", Boyd says.74 
To argue for his claim, he distinguishes compositional plasticity from con-
figurational plasticity, in this way: "Compositional plasticity is displayed by 
a type of state, event, or process to the extent that there are possible realiza-
tions of that state, event, or process that differ in the sorts of substances or 
causal factors that constitute them. Configurational plasticity, in contrast, is 
displayed by a type of state, event, or process to the extent that its possible 
token reahzations differ in the structural configuration or arrangement of 
their constituent parts, events, substances, or causal factors."7s 
According to Boyd, "mental events, states, and processes are like com-
putational states in being entirely configurational, that is, in possessing 
maximal compositional plasticity."76 In fact, on his account, mental events, 
states, and processes have no compositional properties essentially. The 
occurrence of some mental or psychological states in more than one animal 
species shows that mental states shouldn't be identified with physical 
states, since it's highly unlikely that other animals share exactly our neuro-
physiological states; and it's even more unlikely that all logically possible 
animals that have some of the same mental states as human beings would 
have the same physiological states we do. For that reason as well as others, 
Boyd says, "materialism (in its most plausible version) entails that mental 
states are purely configurational"77 and not identical with physical states.7S 
Furthermore, on Boyd's view it is possible for mental events, states, and 
processes to exist without being realized in any matter at all:70 "any particu-
lar actual world mental event, state, or process could be - in some other 
possible world -nonphysically realized."'" Consequently, Boyd says, "A 
materialist account of mental phenomena is quite compatible with the 
view that there are possible worlds in which mental phenomena exist but 
are nonphysical.""' In fact, he maintains, "it is ... fully compatible with a 
plausible materialist psychology that there should be a possible world in 
which there is no matter at all, but in which there are events, states, and 
processes that have all the nonrelational properties essential to the mental 
events, states, and processes manifested in the actual world."82 Mental 
processes and states must be the processes and states of something, how-
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ever, and so on Boyd's view it must also be logically possible that there be 
a mind which is not realized in matter.83 
Boyd thinks of himself as supporting materialism, and he calls his posi-
tion 'materialism without reductionism'. It seems to me, however, that his 
position is very similar to (though, of course, not identical with) that of 
Aquinas, who is not only a dualist but even a substance dualist (in a liberal 
sense of that phrase). Boyd's mental phenomena, like Aquinas's soul, are 
purely configurational.R4 Like the soul in Aquinas's account, mental phe-
nomena on Boyd's view have no essential compositional properties. Even 
more surprising, both Boyd and Aquinas agree in supposing that it is pos-
sible for what is purely configurational to exist on its own apart from any 
material composition and to function in that condition. For both of them, 
then, it is possible that there be functioning, disembodied mental states. 
It is tempting here to suppose that the comparison with Aquinas 
shows Boyd is really a dualist in materialist's clothing." On the other 
hand, we might construe Aquinas as a materialist with respect to 
human beings86 whose metaphysics provides a principled reason for 
thinking that reductionism isn't a necessary corollary to materialism. 
For Aquinas, material objects are composites of matter and form, and a 
composite of matter and form can itself serve as matter for some other, 
more complex composite of matter and form. As complexity increases 
and new forms are produced in the increasingly complex composites, 
new properties as well as new substances will emerge. To reduce the 
composite to its constituent matter or to reduce the properties of the 
composite to just the properties of the composite's components is to 
think that the form of the whole is nothing. But on Aquinas's view the 
form of the whole, the configuration that makes the parts into the 
whole they compose, is an important ontological feature of the world. 
And that is why, on his account, material objects can't be reduced to the 
parts that compose them; insofar as events, states, and processes have 
material components interacting in certain configurations, the same 
point will apply to them. 
But I am more inclined to think it makes no sense to try to determine 
whether Boyd is really a dualist of some sort or Aquinas is really a non-
reductionistic materialist as regards human beings. In my view, the real 
lesson of this detailed examination of Aquinas's account of the soul is to 
show how misleading the dichotomy between materialism and dualism 
is. What Aquinas's account of the soul shows us is that a certain kind of 
(restricted rather than global) materialism - one that takes mental states 
to be implemented in bodily states - is compatible with a certain sort of 
dualism - one that is non-Cartesian in character. To this extent, exami-
nation of Aquinas's account supports Searle's claim that it is a mistake to 
suppose that one must choose between materialism and dualism.87 
Although Boyd accepts the dichotomy between materialism and dual-
ism and means to choose materialism, something he says in support of 
his position helps explain why the dichotomy is misleading or mistaken. 
He says, "The issue [between materialism and dualism] ... has come to be 
described as the issue of whether the corresponding mental and physical 
states are identical [as many materialists have argued] or (as the dualist 
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suggests) merely correlated. . .. this way of putting the question is fun-
damentally misleading. The issue is not identity versus correlation, but 
composition versus correlation."" Boyd supposes that correlation is 
unsuccessful as an account of mind, and he (like Aquinas) builds his 
position around composition. As both Boyd and Aquinas recognize (in 
different ways), however, composition has a twofold nature. On 
Aquinas's view, composition for material objects requires both matter 
and form; on Boyd's view, we can distinguish the configuration of a 
composite from the stuff in which that configuration is realized. If we 
focus on the material stuff and think that composites are identical with 
their material parts, then we are likely to think the mental is identical 
with the physical. If we focus on the configuration as the essential fea-
ture of the mental, our view will look dualistic. But in fact because the 
mind is a complex configuration of a material object, a correct account of 
it will share features of both materialism and dualism. Furthermore, the 
hybrid nature of composition also helps to explain the strength of the 
debate over the nature of the mind. Because the mind is implemented in 
a composite and composition is a hybrid of matter and configuration, 
both materialist and anti-materialist intuitions can find strong support 
from a consideration of the properties and characteristics of the mind. 
Aquinas's account, then, helps us see that the battle lines between 
dualism and materialism are misdrawn.89 It is possible to have a coherent 
account of the mind that satisfies intuitions of both dualists and material-
ists. It's unlikely, of course, that everyone will think Aquinas's account of 
the soul, including the soul's persistence after death, is coherent. But it is 
worth noting here that religious belief isn't necessary for supposing that 
the soul can exist and function apart from the body. Boyd, too, thinks it's 
clear that there can be mental states, events, and processes even in a 
world in which there is no matter at al1. 90 Furthermore, even if we cut out 
all of Aquinas'S account that has to do with the afterlife, that is, if we 
assume that the soul in his account is just one more immaterial form of a 
material object, like the form of C/EBP, which exists only in the compos-
ite it helps constitute, Aquinas's account of the mind would nonetheless 
have the hybrid nature highlighted here. It would still take the mind to 
be something essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless 
- in human beings - realized in material components. And so it would 
still combine features of both dualism and materialism. 
Aquinas's account of the soul, therefore, suggests that to make 
progress on a philosophical understanding of the nature of the mind (as 
distinct from a biological understanding of the mechanisms by which 
the mind operates), it would be good to break down the dichotomy 
between materialism and dualism that takes them to be incompatible 
positions. It also strongly suggests that Cartesian dualism is not essen-
tial to all the major traditions of the major monotheisms. For Aquinas, 
at any rate, the rejection of Cartesian dualism is entirely compatible 
with his view of the nature of the soul."! 
St. Louis University 
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NOTES 
1. Meditation VI, in The PhilosophicaL Writings of Descartes, trans. John 
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), vol.II, p.54. In other places, Descartes seems to hold 
that a complete human being is a compound of body and soul; see, for exam-
ple, his reply to objections, in The Philosophical Writings of Dl'scartes, vol.TI, 
pp.299-300. How this position is to be reconciled with the position in the quota-
tion from Meditation VI is not entirely clear; but my interest in this paper is only 
in the dualism commonly associated with Descartes, regardless of whether or 
not Descartes himself actually held it. For discussion of the extent to which 
Descartes held Cartesian dualism, see, for example, Margaret Wilson, Descartes, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1978), pp.177-185, and Tad Schmaltz, 
"Descartes and Malebranche on Mind and Mind-Body Union", The 
Philosophical Review 1 01 (1992) 281-325. 
2. Summa theologiae (ST) I q.89 a.1. 
3. Summa contra GentiLes (SCG) II. 57. 
4. Quaestiones de anima, q.9 corpus. 
5. Peter van Inwagen thinks that he differs from Aristotle (and others, 
such as Aquinas, who accept the notion of prime matter) because, unlike the 
upholders of prime matter, he believes that "matter is ultimately particulate" 
(Material Beings, [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990], p.3 and p.15). But 
van Inwagen is clearly concerned with actually existing material objects and 
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exactly Aquinas means by 'recollection' here, then, it isn't to be equated with 
memory in general. 
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son, it is the part that has intellect and will, so that there is a sense in which, on 
his account, the person survives death, since the person part that is the soul 
thinks and wills even if it isn't a complete person in its own right. (This is no 
doubt at least part of the reason why he thinks it is appropriate to call the soul 
of Peter 'Peter', as he claims we should do in his discussion of prayer to the 
saints in heaven.) In this sense, the soul is different from other forms of materi-
alobjects. The form of a cathedral without the matter it configures might be 
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other hand, if we are to understand 'body' in (1) as referring just to living 
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being is the matter-form composite of a living human body. 
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Yablo 1990, p.151 (where Yablo describes the claim that a human mind could 
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